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Violated expectations can indeed be funny, as is acknowledged by incongruity theories 
of humor. According to the Benign Violation Theory (BVT), something is perceived as 
humorous when it hits the “sweet spot,” where there is not only a violation, but where the 
violation is also perceived as benign. The BVT specifies how psychological distance plays 
a central role in determining whether a certain event, joke, or other stimulus is perceived 
as benign or malign. In line with the aims of this research topic, we specifically address 
how this “sweet spot” may be influenced by social distance. This form of psychological 
distance has so far received less attention in the BVT than other forms of distance. First, 
we argue that the BVT needs to distinguish between different perspectives in a given 
situation, i.e., between the joke-teller and the joke-listener, and needs to account for the 
social distance between the two parties as well as between each of them and the joke. 
Second, we argue that the BVT needs to acknowledge possible power asymmetries 
between the two parties, and how asymmetries might influence the social distance 
between the joke-teller and joke-listener, as well as between each of these and the joke. 
Based on the assumption that power influences social distance, we argue that power 
asymmetry may explain certain disagreements over whether something is funny. Third, 
we suggest that cultural differences might influence shared perspectives on what is benign 
vs. malign, as well as power balance. Thus, cultural differences might have both a direct 
and an indirect influence on what is perceived as humorous. Finally, we discuss potential 
implications beyond humor, to other social situations with border zones. Close to the 
border, there is often disagreement concerning attempted violations of expectations and 
norms, and concerning their nature as benign or malign. This can for instance occur in 
sexual harassment, #MeToo, bullying, aggression, abusive supervision, destructive 
leadership, counterproductive work behavior, organizational citizenship behavior, parenting, 
and family relations. New understanding of border zones may thus be gained from BVT 
along with our proposed systematically mismatched judgments which parties could make 
about attempted benign violations.
Keywords: benign violation theory, psychological distance, social distance, culture, power asymmetry, 
destructive leadership, anger, humor perception
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To the extent that amusement can be  seen as an emotion, 
it is perhaps the emotion for which there is the strongest uncertainty 
as to what type of antecedents elicit it (McGraw et  al., 2014; 
Martin and Ford, 2018). The fundamental question that any 
psychological theory of humor needs to explain is why something 
is perceived as funny and other things are perceived as not 
funny. A theory developed to answer both questions is the Benign 
Violation Theory (BVT) (McGraw and Warren, 2010; McGraw 
et  al., 2012, 2014; Warren and McGraw, 2016). According to 
this theory, two types of appraisals must be simultaneously present 
for something to be  regarded as funny. First, the stimulus must 
represent a violation which is contrary to expectations and 
threatens the person’s view of what the world “ought” to be. 
Examples could range from being “attacked” by a friend trying 
to tickle you, to violating a linguistic norm. Second, the violation 
must be perceived as benign, which may be influenced by several 
factors. In the current paper, we  specifically focus on the social 
component of psychological distance (cf. Trope and Liberman, 
2010). As will be  accounted for in more detail later, increased 
psychological distance makes minor events appear less funny, 
and more serious events more funny (McGraw et  al., 2012).
However, the BVT has certain limitations, which constitute 
the starting point for this paper. One is that even jokes that 
include norm violations not regarded as benign can sometimes 
be  perceived as funny (Olin, 2016). Another is the failure of 
the theory to account for disagreements between people as to 
whether something is funny within a given situation (Meyer, 
2000). In our view, theories of humor also need to address 
why people sometimes tell jokes that others may find insulting 
or inappropriate. Clearly, what is intended to be  funny by 
someone telling a joke is not always perceived as such by others. 
Even seemingly intelligent and emotionally sensitive people 
sometimes make jokes that others find offensive. For instance, 
a sexual joke told by a leader to a follower in a workplace, 
may be perceived as harassment rather than a joke. The #MeToo 
campaign has shown that sexual harassment often occurs in 
cases where someone tried (or claimed to try) to be  funny. 
Additionally, it often occurs in relationships of asymmetric power, 
and may be  influenced by culture (Luthar and Luthar, 2002).
We suggest that the BVT could potentially be  applicable 
to a broader array of situations if it included three additional 
elements: firstly, a distinction between the joke-teller and joke-
listener; secondly, the role of power differences; thirdly, the 
acknowledgement of the cultural context in which a joke is 
told. All three elements are relevant to the model’s predictions 
about the role of psychological distance in humor. Note that 
we  limit our discussion to cases in which humor is used with 
the intention of amusing others, rather than for other 
communicative purposes (cf. Meyer, 2000).
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE IN THE 
BENIGN VIOLATION THEORY
According to the BVT, psychological distance reduces the 
tendency for people to perceive aversive stimuli or events as 
threatening (McGraw et al., 2014). When something is perceived 
as psychologically distant, people tend to represent them more 
abstractly (Trope and Liberman, 2010). The more psychologically 
distant a violation is, the more likely it therefore is to be perceived 
as benign. A violation can take the form of a threat to a 
person’s physical well-being, identity, or cultural, communicative, 
linguistic, and logical norms (Warren and McGraw, 2016; Warren 
et  al., 2018). A threat is benign when perceived as “safe, 
harmless, acceptable, nonserious, or okay” (Warren et al., 2018, 
p.  5). Examples used by McGraw et  al. (2012) include joking 
about someone stubbing their toe yesterday or being hit by 
a car 5 years ago. Importantly, the theory is not only concerned 
about what makes something funny, but also about what makes 
something not funny. A violation that is too harmless or too 
severe is not funny. Examples include, respectively, making a 
joke about someone stubbing their toe 5 years ago, or someone 
being hit by a car yesterday (McGraw et  al., 2012).
The BVT builds on Trope and Liberman (2010, p. 440), 
construal level theory of psychological distance, in which 
psychological distance is defined as the “subjective experience 
that something is close or far away from the self, here, and 
now.” The theory distinguishes between four dimensions of 
psychological distance: firstly, temporal distance, i.e., whether 
something happened recently or a long time ago; secondly, 
geographical distance, i.e. whether something is physically near 
or far away; thirdly, hypotheticality, i.e. whether something is 
actually happening/perceived or only imagined; fourthly, social 
distance, which Liberman et  al. (2007) exemplified as being 
determined by whether something happens to oneself or others, 
involves someone who is familiar or unfamiliar, or involves 
someone who belongs to an in-group or out-group. They also 
highlighted the relevance of social power.
THE “SWEET SPOT” OF HUMOR IS 
ALSO A MATTER OF SOCIAL DISTANCE
A fundamental question in the BVT is to identify the area 
within which something is regarded as simultaneously benign 
and a violation. In a longitudinal study on temporal distance 
and humor, McGraw et  al. (2014, p.  567), “posit the existence 
of a sweet spot for humor—a time period in which tragedy 
is not too close nor too far away to be humorous.” Throughout 
this paper, we  use the term sweet spot synonymously with the 
distance range (temporal, geographical, social, or hypothetical) 
at which a violation is seen as benign for a given person or 
a dyad, and thus being potentially funny.
One limitation to empirical studies of the BVT is that they 
have not addressed all forms of psychological distance to an 
equal extent. Even though all four forms of distance are 
mentioned in the BVT literature, the main focus seems to 
be on temporal and geographical distance (e.g., McGraw et  al., 
2012, 2014). Accordingly, more is known about the sweet spot 
of humor in relation to these two distance dimensions than 
about hypothetical and social distance. Importantly, we  know 
little about how the sweet spot for humor is influenced by 
social factors, including whether it happens to yourself or 
someone else, whether that “someone” is familiar or unfamiliar 
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to you, or belongs to an in-group or out-group. Similarly, 
we  know little about whether and how the sweet spot for 
humor may be  influenced by social power.
The main emphasis here is on social distance, defined as 
the felt distance or closeness to another person or groups of 
people (Stephan et al., 2011). When we address the psychological 
distance between a person and a joke, social distance refers 
to the felt distance between the focal person and the individual, 
group, cultural practice, norms, or roles that the joke is concerned 
with. In the instances where our claims refer more broadly 
to psychological distance, we  use this broader term.
A stronger focus on the role of social distance in humor 
also requires that theories explicitly distinguish between different 
social perspectives. This is because the sweet spot for humor 
may differ between people. The existence of different perspectives 
is not explicitly acknowledged in BVT, which instead largely 
focuses on situations where there is agreement over whether 
something is funny or not.
Notably, Kim and Plester (2019) also addressed the social 
element of humor, including the existence of multiple social 
roles and perspectives. They demonstrated how the perception 
and usage of humor in an organizational setting may 
be  influenced both by the persons’ relative social positions 
and the culture at large.
THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL 
CONTEXT, POWER, AND CULTURE
Olin (2016) pointed to questions that theories of humor need 
to explain, over and above the fundamental question of what 
makes something funny or not funny. The majority of these 
questions related to the social/societal context in which humor 
takes place. The importance of knowing more about the social 
context of humor is also implicated in the current research 
topic. This goes both for the organizational context (Kim 
and Plester, 2019) and for the larger societal context 
(e.g., Jiang et  al., 2019).
In the BVT, the sweet spot of humor has to do with 
identifying something which is a violation of the expected, 
while simultaneously being benign. However, to the extent 
that a humorous situation involves multiple persons, the sweet 
spot would also be  likely to depend on social variables. One 
example is roles. You  can play around with roles—violate 
them—in a benign fashion. For example, a violation can occur 
when a person by telling a joke steps out of their expected 
role. Such violations may be funny, for instance when a teacher 
starts dancing on the table. However, there are also potentially 
adverse sides of breaking roles or creating ambiguity around 
them (e.g., Örtqvist and Wincent, 2006; Eatough et  al., 2011). 
One example would be  a general practitioner who jokes with 
a patient about breaking doctor-patient confidentiality.
Violation of social expectations may also be  funny. Social 
expectations may pertain to roles, but also to the activities, 
tasks, and goals that social relationships involve. Our social 
relationships to family, friends, leaders, and coworkers can 
involve a goal of catching a bus, getting a work task done, 
or getting the children to bed at night. It is therefore possible 
to violate the relationship itself, but also the activities 
or organizational interests (cf. House and Javidan, 2004; 
Einarsen et  al., 2007).
In line with this general focus on the social element of 
humor, Olin (2016) differentiated between the joke-teller and 
joke-listener. This distinction is drawn in Olin’s discussion of 
jokes that implicate negative group stereotypes. Here, attitudes 
and beliefs of different parties may influence the extent to 
which a joke is perceived as humorous or harmful.
Interestingly, Kim and Plester (2019) drew similar distinctions 
in an ethnographic study of the influence of roles and hierarchy 
on humor perception and expression in Korean work settings. 
They found substantial differences in the contents of and 
reactions to humor among subordinates and superiors. For 
low-power individuals, humor expressions even had negative 
emotional consequences. This study demonstrates the importance 
of addressing multiple social perspectives and power differences 
in humor research.
Our theoretical account is also in line with a recent empirical 
study by Knegtmans et  al. (2018), who studied the influence 
of power on the perception of jokes. However, here power 
was conceptualized as a temporary psychological state. In 
contrast, our conceptualization of power goes beyond temporary 
states, feelings or experiences of power. We  focus on more 
stable power asymmetries deriving from hierarchical differences 
in organizations, and from social roles. Examples include a 
leader’s position compared to a subordinate’s, an emperor’s 
compared to a peasant’s, and a parent’s compared to a child’s. 
Furthermore, we  emphasize the important role of culture, 
which is likely to have a direct influence on the shared norms 
for what constitutes a violation and what is considered benign 
(e.g., Gray and Ford, 2013). Culture could also influence 
norms for expressing amusement. It might also influence 
power differences and social distance in various ways. Thus, 
it could have both direct and indirect effects on 
humor perception.
To the extent that humor perception is influenced by power 
differences and culture, this may largely take place through 
their influence on social distance. Even though social distance, 
power, and culture are discussed separately in subsequent 
sections, it is important to keep their interrelatedness in mind.
THREE SUGGESTED ELEMENTS THAT 
COULD BE  ADDED TO BENIGN 
VIOLATION THEORY
We now turn to three components that in our view need to 
be included in the BVT to increase its explanatory value. These 
are in line with Olin’s (2016) suggestion to focus on the social 
aspects of humor in understanding when incongruent events 
are perceived as humorous and when they are not. They 
specifically address “boundary areas” of humor (e.g., Plester, 
2016). These components are (1) distinguishing between the 
joke-teller and the joke-listener; (2) addressing possible power 
differences between the joke-teller and the joke-listener; and 
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(3) acknowledging the influence of culture on the relationship 
between power differences and humor.
Note that this discussion will be  limited to situations in 
which someone intentionally tells a joke to someone else, and 
where the intention is to be  funny by hitting the sweet spot 
of both joke-teller and joke-listener. This is in contrast to any 
intentionally dark uses of humor (cf. Plester, 2016) aimed 
beyond the sweet spot, deliberately hurting the joke-listener, 
such as in power play, conflicts, ostracism, or bullying. A 
joke-teller may attempt both to split a crowd, hit the sweet 
spot with someone, while victimizing others (cf. Salmivalli, 
2010). Again, our discussion concerns attempts to hit the sweet 
spot, and associated risks of over- or undershooting.
Joke-Teller vs. Joke-Listener
Empirical research on the BVT seems to mostly address situations 
in which someone regards or does not regard something as funny 
(McGraw and Warren, 2010; McGraw et al., 2012, 2014; Warren 
et  al., 2018). However, one does not specifically differentiate 
between a joke-teller and a joke-listener, and whether different 
perspectives may influence the extent to which something is 
perceived as benign, a violation, and funny. If one is to understand 
humor at a level beyond the individual, this distinction is essential.
Thus, psychological distance in the BVT seems to normally 
be  conceived of in terms of the distance from the person (who 
could either be the joke-teller or the joke-listener) to the something 
(the stimulus, which could either be  a joke or an episode). The 
social setting in which the something is observed, heard, or 
experienced is not taken into consideration. In reality, a social 
setting would normally involve several people who would have 
different roles and perspectives and could in principle disagree 
as to whether the joke was a violation, whether it was benign, 
and whether it was funny. We  choose here to use Olin’s (2016) 
terminology of joke-teller and joke-listener. Other related concepts 
are humor user, target person, and audience (Meyer, 2000).
Whether a joke told by a joke-teller to a joke-listener is 
perceived as funny by either or both of them could depend 
on a number of factors that would influence the extent to 
which something would simultaneously be  seen as benign and 
a violation. It can be  meaningful to analyze this in terms of 
the following four subtypes of social distance in a joke setting, 
namely sections “Social Distance Between Joke-Listener and 
Joke”; “Social Distance Between Joke-Teller and Joke”; “Social 
Distance Between Joke-Teller and Joke-Listener”; and “The 
Relative Social Distance Between Joke-Teller, Joke, and Joke-
Listener.” We  think that all four forms of relationships are 
relevant for both parties. However, because the joke-teller is 
the active part, s/he is perhaps more likely to actively consider 
these distances when preparing for a joke delivery than the 
joke-listener is when hearing a joke. In the following, we  only 
provide selected examples illustrating either of these perspectives.
Social Distance Between Joke-Listener and Joke
The one form of distance that McGraw et  al. (2012, 2014) have 
most clearly addressed is the psychological distance between the 
joke-listener and the joke. They addressed how a joke-listener can 
feel temporally close or distant to an event, depending on whether 
it happened recently or long ago. Similarly, a joke can pertain to 
something geographically close or far away. Here, we  argue that 
a joke-listener and a joke also may be  socially distant or socially 
close, as perceived by the joke-listener or joke-teller.
The social distance to a joke would be conceptualized slightly 
differently depending on whether or not the joke directly 
addresses specific people. To the extent that a joke refers to 
a person or group of people, the social distance to the joke 
would directly correspond to the social distance to those 
involved, whether it was a specific person or a group. Even 
jokes that do not refer to specific people may still have contents 
that are relevant to the social roles, social identities, attitudes, 
cultural practices, values, and norms of a joke-listener. The 
social distance to the joke would then depend on the person’s 
commitment or dedication to each of these. For instance, 
Hemmasi et  al. (1994) showed that sexist jokes targeting the 
opposite sex were regarded as more funny (by men and women) 
than sexist jokes targeting one’s own gender. Similarly, violations 
could be  more likely to be  viewed as benign if concerned 
with an out-group or unfamiliar persons.
The social and ethnic groups and cultures to which the 
joke-listener belongs or associates her-/himself with would 
obviously be  important. The history and identity of that larger 
group or culture in general could also be  relevant.
Social Distance Between Joke-Teller and Joke
Another form of distance seemingly overlooked by the BVT is 
the perceived/attributed social distance between the joke-teller 
and joke, as perceived by either party. This refers to whether 
the joke-teller is perceived as either socially distant from or 
socially close to the content of the joke. The joke-teller’s perception 
of this may be  likely to influence what s/he chooses to joke 
about. It is well established in research on attribution that 
emotional responses are highly influenced by inferences of 
responsibility, including intent, causal controllability, free will, 
and other associated concepts (e.g., Weiner, 1993, 2006). Therefore, 
the joke-listener’s perception of this form of distance could 
influence how s/he perceives the intention of the joke-teller. For 
instance, imagine someone (with intact vision) who tells a joke 
about blind persons. Whether this violation is seen as benign, 
and whether the joke is perceived as funny, might depend on 
whether the joke-perceiver knows or thinks that the joke-teller 
has had a close personal relationship with someone who is blind.
Thus, the perceived social distance between the joke-teller 
and the joke might be influenced by the one person’s perception 
of the other’s attitudes, social roles, social identities, cultural 
affiliation, etc. (Liberman et  al., 2007; Trope and Liberman, 
2010). The perception of the joke-teller’s actual roles and 
identities may be more or less accurate.
Social Distance Between Joke-Teller and  
Joke-Listener
The social distance between the joke-teller and joke-listener 
is also relevant. This point is related to but not overlapping 
with the two previous points.
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The closeness of the relationship between the two parties 
is important. If the joke-teller and joke-listener do not have 
a close personal relationship, it is relevant whether the 
joker is familiar or unfamiliar, or belongs to an in-group or 
an out-group. Note that the two parties may have a different 
idea of what the social distance is between them.
Power differences, that is the relative power between two 
parties, appears to be  a crucially important variable in this 
context. Hemmasi et  al. (1994) asked survey respondents to 
indicate how likely they would be  to perceive sexual and sexist 
humor as sexual harassment, if coming from a person of the 
opposite gender who was either a coworker or leader. Both 
sexist and sexual gender-related jokes were more likely to 
be  perceived as sexual harassment when the joke-teller was a 
leader rather than a coworker. Hemmasi et  al. (1994, p.  1125) 
concluded that “Regardless of the manager’s intent (i.e., to 
deliberately insult/intimidate the subordinate, or merely to 
innocently retell an ‘amusing’ joke), such behavior is a high-
risk activity.” We  will discuss power differences in section 
“Power Differences and the Case of Asymmetry.”
The Relative Social Distance Between Joke-Teller, 
Joke, and Joke-Listener
Importantly, any of the three previous types of social distance 
cannot be understood in isolation. Whether a joke is perceived 
as a benign violation will also depend on the relative distances 
between the joke-teller, joke, and joke-listener. The social 
distance between a joke-listener and joke-teller may moderate 
whether a joke is perceived as benign or not. For instance, 
a sexist joke about women, told to a woman by a man unknown 
to her, and belonging to a different social or cultural group, 
could be  perceived as more malign and offensive, and less 
funny, than the same joke told by a close female colleague 
belonging to one’s in-group. Similarly, imagine your grandfather 
attempting a joke, using a term which is insulting among 
millennials. If you  attribute a well-meaning intent and infer 
it to be  unknowingly done due to distance to the lingo of 
the youth, you  may still laugh. Thus, we  suggest the relative 
distance between joke-teller, joke, and joke-listener as a fourth 
type of social distance relevant to humor. Again, different 
parties may disagree in their perception of these relationships 
in a given situation.
Implications
Note that all four types of distance identified here (sections 
“Social Distance Between Joke-Listener and Joke” to “The 
Relative Social Distance Between Joke-Teller, Joke, and Joke-
Listener”) could also be  applied to other dimensions of 
psychological distance. For instance, the joke-teller and 
joke-listener could be  temporally or geographically close 
or far apart, as could the content of the joke be  to either 
or both parties. However, since the focus of this paper is 
on the social dimension, we  will not discuss the influence 
of the other dimensions any further. Nevertheless, it is 
important to keep in mind that social distance may 
be  influenced also by geographical and temporal distance. 
For example, a leader who sits in the office next door and 
who you  interact with frequently might (from your 
perspective) feel socially closer than a leader who sits in 
the headquarters in a different city, and who you  only 
communicate with by email a few times every month (cf. 
Antonakis and Atwater, 2002).
Power Differences and the  
Case of Asymmetry
Asymmetric Power and Social Distance
In our view, a potentially important element in the relationship 
between the joke-teller and the joke-listener is that of power. 
Notably, the theory of psychological distance that the BVT 
largely draws on has specified that power is a predictor of 
social distance. The presence of power differences between 
individuals or groups of individuals may influence the perceived 
social distance of both parties. High-power people see themselves 
as more different and distant from others than low-power 
people do (Liberman et  al., 2007). This is of course primarily 
a question of relative distance. Power differences could very 
well increase the absolute social distance as perceived by the 
low-power individual—a notion compatible with theories on 
leader distance (e.g., Antonakis and Atwater, 2002). The 
important point is that power differences would always increase 
the social distance as perceived by the high-power individual 
even more.
In addition, Smith and Trope (2006) argued that increased 
power leads to increased tendencies to think more abstractly, 
a tendency indicative of larger social distance from others. 
They conducted a series of experiments where participants 
were primed with power concepts, and claimed to find that 
such priming increased people’s tendency for abstract, high-
level construals.
If power is an additional determinant of construal level, 
power differences may be  relevant in the search for a “sweet 
spot” within which both joke-teller and joke-listener can agree 
on a joke constituting a benign violation. It is therefore surprising 
that these elements have not yet been systematically integrated 
into the BVT.
In their Social Distance Theory of Power (SDTP), Magee 
and Smith (2013) have built on the positive correspondence 
between power, abstract construals, and increased social distance 
reported by Smith and Trope (2006). A central point in SDTP 
is that power asymmetry may lead to asymmetry in the perceived 
social distance between two parties of a dyad: whereas a 
low-power individual may feel relatively close to a high-power 
individual, the high-power individual may feel relatively distant 
to the same low-power individual. Their theory is mostly 
concerned with dyadic relationships where power is related 
to interdependence. However, it could be  relevant to other 
types of relationships where interdependence is less present 
or central than in dyads.
Of particular interest are those cases where there is asymmetric 
power between the joke-teller and the joke-listener. What Magee 
and Smith (2013) hypothesized about the relationship between 
asymmetric experiences of social distance and power could 
provide an important contribution here.
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Asymmetric Power and the Benign  
Violation Theory
How can the basic ideas in the SDTP (Magee and Smith, 
2013) be  incorporated into the BVT? In principle, asymmetric 
power might influence all four forms of social distance 
presented previously.
Most fundamentally, power asymmetry might influence the 
social distance between a joke-teller and a joke-listener. According 
to Magee and Smith (2013), this in turn may have several 
cognitive and emotional consequences for how the other person 
is perceived. For example, they argue that high power is 
associated with a reduced feeling of being similar to the other 
person. In contrast, low power is characterized by a stronger 
tendency to feel similar when comparing oneself to others. 
Moreover, high power is associated with reduced attention and 
responsiveness to the mental states, thoughts and feelings of 
other people. According to the SDTP, this may lead high-power 
individuals in an asymmetric relationship to display empathic 
inaccuracy (Magee and Smith, 2013). This is consistent with 
experimental findings showing that high social class predicts 
increased unethical behavior (Piff et  al., 2012): the unethical 
behaviors in the experiments included ignoring shared norms, 
even rules, with high-social class individuals allowing themselves 
to break traffic rules and steal candy from children. It is worth 
noting that the mediating mechanism was a baseline-difference 
in mind-set between high- and low-class individuals.
How does this influence whether something is perceived as 
a benign violation, and funny, in a situation where a joke-teller 
tells a joke to a joke-listener? According to predictions derived 
from the SDTP, this would crucially depend both on which 
form of social distance (sections “Social Distance Between Joke-
Listener and Joke” to “The Relative Social Distance Between 
Joke-Teller, Joke, and Joke-Listener”) we  are concerned with, in 
combination with the particular power balance in the relationship.
Let us first turn to the case where the joke-teller is in the 
high-power position, and the joke-listener is in a low-power 
position. This is a potentially risky situation in the sense that 
the joke-teller experiences a greater social distance both toward 
the joke and the joke-listener than the joke-listener does. As 
a consequence, it takes more for the high-power joke-teller 
to regard something as a violation, and more for something 
to be  perceived as benign. For instance, the joke-teller may 
feel that it is more appropriate to make jokes about events 
that are closer in time, geographically, or socially, than the 
joke-listener feels. Another way to put it—the impropriety 
threshold (for when a violation is no longer perceived as benign) 
is higher for the high-position joke-teller (cf. Geddes and 
Callister, 2007). This might not pose a problem in cases where 
the power distribution is symmetrical. However, when the 
joke-listener is in a low-power position, their impropriety 
threshold becomes correspondingly lower. This might imply a 
smaller (or no) overlap between the sweet spots of the two 
parties. Thus, a violation could more easily be  perceived as 
malign. If the high-power joke-teller is also less “empathically 
accurate” (cf. Magee and Smith, 2013), s/he might not realize 
that the violation was perceived as malign by the other, which 
could contribute to a vicious cycle.
Magee and Smith (2013) also claimed that power is related 
to the tendency to experience socially engaging versus disengaging 
emotions. They argued that high-power individuals are less 
motivated to affiliate with others and therefore less likely to 
experience socially engaging emotions and more likely to 
experience socially disengaging emotions. To the extent that 
humor is a socially engaging emotion, an additional prediction 
can therefore be  that this tendency further increases the high-
power joke-teller’s threshold for experiencing something as 
funny. This could further increase the risk of offensive jokes.
As the idiom goes, it is lonely at the top. It is also safer to 
shout out. Those below may however perceive the same as a 
beginning avalanche. For a high-power individual to hit the sweet 
spot with a joke to a low-power individual, s/he needs to decrease 
the severity or increase the social distance between the joke content 
and the joke-listener. This principle is perhaps reflected in the 
frequent practice of making jokes about people from a neighboring 
country. For instance, Swedes among themselves joking about 
Norwegians and vice versa, and Americans joking about Canadians.
What then about the case of a joke-teller being in a low-power 
position and the joke-listener in a high-power position? This 
should be  a less critical situation. Here, it would take more 
for the high-power joke-listener to perceive something as a 
violation, and to perceive a violation as malign, than it would 
take for the low-power joke-teller. Thus, the biggest danger 
might perhaps be  that the high-power joke-listener would 
be  less likely to be  amused by jokes that the low-power joke-
teller thinks represent benign violations. This is indeed consistent 
with what Knegtmans et  al. (2018) found when they induced 
experimental participants with states of high or low power. 
High-power participants were less likely to rate jokes as 
inappropriate, offensive, and also less funny. These findings 
are compatible with the assumption that high-power individuals’ 
“impropriety threshold” (cf. Geddes and Callister, 2007) was 
higher, and that they may not have perceived the joke as a 
violation. Thus, asymmetric power relation is also likely to 
involve an asymmetry in what a joke-teller and a joke-listener 
regards as funny, offensive, or simply boring. Again, the challenge 
would be  to find the sweet spot that overlaps for the joke-
teller and joke-listener. For a low-power individual to hit the 
sweet spot with a joke to a high-power individual, one needs 
to increase the severity or to somehow decrease the distance, 
e.g., getting more personal with the high-power individual. 
The latter may of course have cultural limitations/restrictions, 
or even involve cultural taboos—one is not always at liberty 
to inform the emperor that he  is in fact naked.
We do not claim to be  the first to suggest that social power 
may be an important variable for the BVT to take into account. 
Knegtmans et  al. (2018) also addressed possible implications 
for the jokes one might choose to tell. However, their main 
emphasis was on how the power of the joke-listener influenced 
perceived inappropriateness, offensiveness, and funniness of 
jokes. Moreover, they did not discuss the case of asymmetric 
power, or possible consequences of power differences between 
a joke-teller and joke-listener. Additionally, their emphasis was 
on power as a state variable rather than more stable 
power differences.
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Superimposed Sweet Spots?
It follows that a joke-teller in a certain power position may have 
one sweet spot as defined by the BVT, whereas a joke-listener 
in a different power position may have a different sweet spot 
as defined by the BVT. If one were to superimpose one over 
the other, it may become logical why a given joke may be offending 
for one person, bland for another, or if all goes well—funny for 
both. If the superimposition revealed nonoverlapping areas, these 
could be described as the “asymmetric upper” (i.e., the joke-teller 
considers it a benign violation, but the joke-listener considers 
it a malign violation—offensive) and the “asymmetric lower” (i.e., 
the joke-teller considers it a benign violation, but the joke-listener 
considers it benign, but not a violation—bland). This can 
be  understood in relationship to section “The Relative Social 
Distance Between Joke-Teller, Joke, and Joke-listener.” The relative 
social distances involved in the triad of the joke-teller, the joke-
listener, and the joke might be  perceived differently by the joke-
teller and the joke-listener.
Cultural Differences
We started by discussing the different roles of the joke-listener 
and joke-teller. We  argued that the social distance between 
each of these and the joke, as well as the relative distance 
between the three, is not always identical. This may in turn 
lead to differences in perception. We then turned to how power 
asymmetry may generate asymmetry in social distance, making 
it possible for the two parties to have different sweet spots 
of humor for a given joke in a given setting. We  will now 
place these factors in the broader context, by highlighting three 
ways in which culture may influence the sweet spot of humor.
First, cultural differences may influence the absolute level 
of what is considered benign or malign for entire societies or 
organizations. Even though humor is a universal phenomenon, 
there are also cultural differences. These may concern both 
how humor is perceived, valued, and used (cf. Jiang et  al., 
2019 for a review). Jiang et  al. (2019) largely focused on the 
broader cultural differences, especially those between Eastern 
and Western societies. However, differences between subcultures, 
i.e., between different cultural groups in a country as well as 
regional groups within a country, could also have an influence 
on humor perception and usage. The role of subcultures is 
illustrated by an empirical study by Gray and Ford (2013). 
People’s interpretation of sexist jokes differed depending on 
whether jokes were told in a setting where such jokes were 
tolerated (i.e., a comedy club) or prohibited (i.e., a workplace). 
Here, it may also be  meaningful to point to the possible 
influence of organizational culture (e.g., Geddes and Callister, 
2007), which could influence the absolute level of how certain 
groups of individuals may perceive or use humor. Cultural 
differences (between societies, organizations, or even families) 
may also influence the extent to which individuals are expected 
or allowed to express certain emotions. In the case of humor, 
this is relevant to the extent that such cultural differences 
concern the appropriateness of expressing amusement (e.g., 
Gottman et  al., 1996; Magee and Smith, 2013). Cultures may 
thus dictate a shared impropriety threshold (for when a violation 
is no longer seen as benign). It might also be  meaningful to 
think of cultural values influencing the permeability of the 
border, as well as the willingness to explore border areas. This 
goes for societies in general (Gelfand et al., 2011; Plester, 2016), 
organizations (Plester, 2009), as well as for other social entities.
Second, cultural differences may influence power differences 
in multiple ways. According to the classic theory of Hofstede 
(1980), high versus low power distance is one of four dimensions 
along which national cultures differ. Obviously, culture may 
therefore influence high-power and low-power positions as is also 
known from cross-cultural leadership research (e.g., Antonakis 
and Atwater, 2002; Chhokar et  al., 2007; Aktas et  al., 2015). 
Magee and Smith (2013) pointed to two important ways in 
which culture may influence power asymmetry, which in our 
view may be  particularly relevant to the case of humor. Their 
first point is that since culture may influence people’s beliefs 
about what behavior is considered appropriate for a high-power 
individual, power differences may not necessarily lead to 
asymmetric social distance in all cultures. Their second point 
is that cultures may differ in the extent to which they take for 
granted or justify power differences. Therefore, in some cultures, 
low-power individuals may experience equal levels of social 
distance as high-power individuals in a given relationship. The 
implication of our current arguments is that culture could influence 
the circumstances under which a joke told between two individuals 
belonging to the same culture is seen as funny or malignant.
Our third point concerns those cases in which the joke-
teller and joke-listener have different cultural backgrounds. In 
this case, cultural differences may influence the relative thresholds 
for each party. Using the same analogy as previously, cultural 
differences may cause the superimposed sweet spots to change 
in relative location, and perhaps even in shape.
As mentioned earlier, the important role of culture in influencing 
power asymmetry has to date been overlooked in studies that 
address the possible role of social power in BVT (Knegtmans 
et  al., 2018). It could also be  added that the influence of culture 
is likely to be  slow to change. It is probably slower than group-
level changes in hierarchical roles in an organization, or even 
in a family. Moreover, definitely slower than an individual level 
state of power (e.g., Knegtmans et  al., 2018). An important 
message of the current paper is that the BVT needs to acknowledge 
how culture might influence the mechanisms specified by the theory.
IMPLICATIONS OF OUR CLAIMS
“From a distance there is harmony” (Julie Gold)
We have suggested that the humor mechanism accounted 
for by the BVT needs to be specified and extended, also beyond 
recent efforts (e.g., Knegtmans et  al., 2018). The BVT explains 
why some attempts may succeed, some may fall short, and 
others may overshoot the sweet spot. Our emphasis on the 
role of potential power asymmetry may explain why a joke-
teller and a joke-listener may perceive the sweet spot to be  of 
different size and different location. Power asymmetry entails 
distance asymmetry, and therefore different sweet spots. This 
may lead to some humorous attempts to remain unnoticed 
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by high-power individuals, and other efforts being perceived 
as offensive by low-power individuals. The former may involve 
frustrated low-power individuals not gaining acknowledgement 
from high-power listeners. The latter may however touch quite 
sinister topics, such as sexual harassment, bullying, abusive 
supervision, destructive leadership, and so on.
Our theoretical suggestions may have consequences for who 
can joke about what with whom. Do you come from a position 
of power, be it formal or informal? Leaders, parents, representatives 
of the dominant cultural group, the dominant gender, the 
in-group, the seniors at the workplace may all see a different 
sweet spot than their counterparts. This may be  of value in 
humor research. For instance, when investigating jokes in romantic 
relationships, in workplaces, on the sports field, and so on.
Our small addendum to BVT is to acknowledge two aspects. 
Both are in line with recommendations to attend more to 
social contexts in humor research (Olin, 2016), and social 
power beyond temporary experimental states (Knegtmans et al., 
2018): first, the importance of two main parties, the joke-teller 
and the joke-listener; second, power-related asymmetry in the 
cases it exists, and how it may influence four forms of perceived 
social distance asymmetrically. Herein lies the systematic potential 
for mismatched maps. When superimposing the different maps 
of the high-power party and the low-power party, it does not 
only reveal a fixed border zone, but a disputed no-man’s-land 
with split opinions, perhaps even a frontier for change.
Benign violations reside between two outer areas which the 
majority can agree on. One outer area being unequivocal good, 
in humor constituting the benign but non-funny. The other 
being the unequivocal bad, in humor the harmful where only 
the violation remains. In between lies the sweet spot—a violation 
also perceived as benign. Such sweet spots, we  suggest, exist 
in other models of social interaction. Therefore, it could 
be  possible to bring the BVT into a greater social context. If 
benign violations may take the form of any type of behavior 
occurring in the narrow border areas between the acceptable 
and unacceptable in everyday social interaction, the theoretical 
implications of our arguments may be  broad.
Even though this paper is a conceptual analysis, we  here 
briefly exemplify some ideas for empirical research that could 
be  used to test our claims. The ideal way to test our model 
would be  a full factorial design testing the joint effect of 
distance, power, and culture on perceived severity and amusement, 
inspired by existing procedures (e.g., Hemmasi et  al., 1994; 
Knegtmans et  al., 2018). However, quasi-experimental 
investigations could also be  used. One example is to study 
sub-components of the model where naturally occurring power 
differences are relatively stable, as in hierarchical organizations 
such as hospital wards or families, or in organizations where 
hierarchies may change across time (Breevaart et  al., 2014).
BRINGING BENIGN VIOLATION THEORY 
INTO A BROADER SOCIAL CONTEXT
We now turn to other forms of benign versus malign violations, 
beyond humor. If the phenomena include a sweet spot as well 
as power differences, the BVT with our addendums may 
supplement the understanding of border areas in other models.
There are solemn issues in everyday life, described by 
established theoretical models, which also concern what can 
be  seen as dual thresholds in social interaction. These are 
cases where there is a sweet spot or zone between the expected 
and the unexpected, the in-role behavior and extra-role behavior, 
the normal and the non-normal, the constructive and the 
destructive, the expressed and the improper, the good and the 
bad. Here, a benign violation would not necessarily be associated 
with humor or amusement, but could be  associated with other 
positive emotions (e.g., appreciation, enthusiasm, respect) and 
have other positive personal and interpersonal consequences 
(e.g., organizational improvement, loyalty, identification).
Among the areas which we thus suggest may encompass benign 
violations, we find the sweet spots described more or less explicitly 
in relevant theoretical models. Some models clearly establish a 
sweet spot, whereas others only indirectly imply its existence.
An explicit sweet spot can be  found in the dual threshold 
model of anger in organizations (Geddes and Callister, 2007), 
which directly corresponds to the basic notion in BVT. Not 
expressing anger is in the normal or unequivocally good zone. 
Anger above the expressed threshold but below the impropriety 
threshold is in the sweet spot. Expressed anger can thus quickly 
enter into the bad and vast realm of over-the-line aggression. 
A notable similarity to our line of reasoning is that Geddes 
and Callister (2007) argued that culture may influence where 
the shared thresholds are set, in their case through an implicit 
agreement for each organization. A dissimilarity is that our 
reasoning on power asymmetry opens up for multiple, 
simultaneous, and asymmetric fields for individuals.
Other models also attend to a form of sweet spot, although 
the correspondence to BVT mechanisms is less explicit. For instance, 
organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) (cf. Spector and Fox, 
2010) refers to a form of extra-role behavior, where an employee 
goes above and beyond the call of duty. It is thus a violation of 
the expected or contractual obligations, which also is deemed 
benign. However, discussions on OCB include reflections on the 
facts that (1) the expected behavior should not be  left undone 
and (2) everyone cannot exclusively perform out of the ordinary 
OCB. The bland, boring, and necessary task must be  done—
someone must sweep the floor. In other words, there is a “too 
much” in OCB, which may become offensive. This behavior can 
thus be  both benign and malign if present. In a similar vein, in 
a study on workplace bullying enacted by leaders, Rayner and 
Cooper (2003) discussed spectrum behavior. That is, behavior which 
if present could be  either benign or malign. Humor with its 
bright and dark uses could in general be  considered a type of 
spectrum behavior (cf. Plester, 2016). This is in contrast to behavior 
which, if present, is either exclusively malign or benign. Examples 
are, respectively, humiliating people, or displaying constructive 
leader behavior (Rayner and Cooper, 2003).
Yet other models give a lot of attention to the good or the 
bad, but less to the border area. An example is destructive 
leadership (Einarsen et  al., 2007) pertaining to leaders—along 
with several alternate concepts such as abusive supervision (Tepper, 
2000) or toxic leadership (Padilla et al., 2007), and counterproductive 
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work behavior (Spector and Fox, 2010) pertaining to subordinates. 
In these models, it is clear that severe anti-subordinate/interpersonal 
and anti-organizational behavior is bad, and correspondingly, 
that strongly pro-subordinate/interpersonal and pro-organizational 
behavior is good. The border may however be  ambiguous, hard 
to define, and influenced by a variety of factors.
Some of these solemn issues by definition involve power 
asymmetry, for instance leaders and subordinates operating in a 
formal hierarchical system, where anger, destructive leader behavior, 
and destructive subordinate behavior occur. However, such behaviors 
may also take place in other contexts of power asymmetry, for 
example in families. Gender-related asymmetry may for instance 
be found in matriarchies and patriarchies. In any culture, societal 
or subcommunity, there are also dominant in-groups and minority 
out-groups with power asymmetries aplenty.
A methodological implication is the need to consider 
appropriate levels of analysis (Yammarino and Dansereau, 2008). 
By this, we  mean that the individualized or dyadic level of 
analysis may be  particularly relevant in the border zone, and 
group-level analysis more relevant with increasing levels of 
severity (be it good or bad). That is, in the border zone, relative 
power and distance will lead to individual variation, which 
may be  detectable as dyadic level significant effects. However, 
with such variation, an entire team or an entire family or 
audience may not agree on the ratings. Thus, inter-rater reliability 
should be  low. With increasing severity, more individuals will 
agree on the joke being bland or offensive, the expressed anger 
being improper, or the leadership behavior being clearly 
destructive. High social distance is notably also associated with 
group-level outcomes (Antonakis and Atwater, 2002).
A potential theoretical implication is whether change is possible 
through the suggested mechanisms. In the “sweet spot” lies the 
potential for positive change. Humor used with ambitions to 
“develop organizational culture” has been empirically reported 
(Plester, 2016, p.  88). We  may consider an appropriate level of 
OCB as a case of benign violations. We may also consider whether 
nonviolent change such as that of Gandhi could be another. Gandhi 
(1940) emphasized just barely breaking the (oppressive) law, without 
hurting others, and while telling the truth. In everyday working 
life, leaders may need to violate the interests of either the organization 
or the subordinates at times, in order to facilitate change. An 
example of the former would be  a middle manager motivated by 
a wish to protect the flock while breaking organizational interests, 
thus displaying friendly-disloyal leader behavior (cf. Einarsen et al., 
2007). Examples of the latter would include virtuous betrayal toward 
subordinates which Krantz (2006, p. 221), argues leaders sometimes 
have to do “in the service of higher purposes.” As this involves 
pushing subordinates beyond their comfort zone, it bears similarities 
to borderline tyrannical leadership (cf. Einarsen et  al., 2007).
In contrast, a change for the worse is often diffuse and 
done in a series of malign violations, each of which could 
be  minor, i.e., just passing the impropriety threshold. Corrupt 
organizations or totalitarian states are rarely created overnight. 
Passivity and silence are often required of many, as in the 
rise of the Nazi regime (Lewin, 1943) or with the #MeToo. 
Malign violations are accepted in spite of opposing views. 
Power asymmetry could be an integral part, where the low-power 
person, the new employee, the young, and so on want to 
appeal to the high-power person. Perhaps they modify their 
emotions for organizational survival as they typically do, 
suppressing negative emotions and exaggerating positive emotions 
(Glasø et  al., 2006), including laughing at the rich man’s joke. 
The stepwise nature of malign violations might increase the 
likelihood for change. The high-power individual takes an ever 
so little step over the line, “and then, if you  are drawn in, 
next week it will be  something a little further from the rules” 
(Lewis, 1949, p.  63). With the behavioral step already taken, 
the low-power individual is left only with the opportunity to 
change the values in order to resolve the cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1962).
We could also mention other social phenomena characterized 
by sweet spots of acceptable behavior, and where the border 
between the benign/acceptable and the malign is likely to 
be  influenced by social distance, cultural norms, and power 
distribution. Examples would include (but not be  limited to) 
white lies, courtesy, and cursing.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our attempt to specify the role of social distance in the BVT, 
focusing on power differences and culture, could be  seen as 
a first step in identifying the mechanisms that are involved 
when social norms and expectations are unsuccessfully violated. 
Even though this paper has focused on the intentional joke 
leading to unintentional crossings, inappropriate crossings may 
of course also be  done intentionally (cf. Plester, 2016).
We have focused on voluntary behavior, intended on hitting 
the funny—the sweet spot—which is both a violation of the 
expected and something benign. We  have argued that there 
may exist a systematic tendency explaining certain cases of 
mismatch between parties, with a potential for transgressions. 
This systematic tendency cannot be  fully understood unless 
set in a social context where the potentially great influence 
of culture and power asymmetries are incorporated. This has 
implications for our understanding of humor in general, humor 
in asymmetric power relationships, as well as for understanding 
other situations of benign violations, far beyond humor.
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